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EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: JUST CAUSE
PROTECTION THROUGH MANDATORY
ARBITRATION
Wrongful termination litigation is a growth industry; it has been referred
to as "the labor law issue of the 80's."1 Employees are becoming in-
creasingly inventive in finding ways to sue their employers for wrongful
termination, and courts are becoming increasingly receptive to these
claims. 2 Before courts eliminate the doctrine of employment at will,
however, courts should consider the needs and interests of employees,
employers and society as a whole. 3
Employees' primary interest in wrongful termination litigation is job
security.4 Job security has many meanings. It may imply a tenure system
with discharge for exceptional circumstances only. On the other hand, it
may refer to a limited training and transfer system for reassigning displaced
employees. The question is what type of "security" the average employee
needs.
Employers, by contrast, are primarily interested in management free-
dom. 5 Restricting management's freedom to terminate employees affects
the employer by increasing costs and reducing productivity. Productivity is
reduced when management retains incompetent or unnecessary employees
for fear of litigation. Costs are increased through both litigation and
remedial costs. Moreover, society has an interest in minimizing, to the
extent possible, the costs of resolving wrongful termination disputes.
When balancing these interests, two questions arise: What restrictions,
if any, should be placed on an employer's right to determine its workforce,
and what forum, judicial or administrative, is appropriate to enforce these
limitations? Courts and commentators generally agree that an employer
1. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor
Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1 (1984). There were 229 state and federal employment at will
decisions reported in 1984. Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the WorkPlace, I LAB. LAW. 777,
785 (hereinafter Committee Report).
2. See infra notes 20-55 and accompanying text for the development of wrongful termination
doctrine.
3. See, e.g., Catler, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the Employment at Will Rule, 5
INDUS. REL. L.J. 471 (1983); Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the Courts Forgotten
the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 201 (1982).
4. The concept of job security figures prominently in numerous employment at will cases. See,
e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (creating an atmosphere
of job security implies an obligation to terminate only for cause); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (employee expectations of job security creates an implied employment
contract); see also Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 1404 (1967).
5. See Catler, supra note 3; Note, supra note 3.
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should not have unfettered discretion to terminate an employee. 6 Indeed, in
forty-one states, courts have adopted some restriction governing the dis-
charge of employees. 7 By contrast, the question of the appropriate enforce-
ment mechanism remains unresolved, and is, therefore, the focus of this
Comment. For both theoretical and practical reasons, ajudicial approach to
wrongful termination is inappropriate. Instead, a statutory guarantee of
termination only for cause, coupled with an administrative system of
enforcement, can better balance the competing concerns. Such a scheme
would benefit both employers and employees. Finally, Washington should
adopt such an administrative system.
I. THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
A. Historical Development
Until the late 19th century, an employee hired for an indefinite term was
presumed to be hired for one year, with the employment contract renewable
annually by the parties. 8 At that time, virtually all American courts adopted
the presumption that an employee hired for an indefinite term was employed
at will and could be terminated "for good cause, for no cause, or even for
cause morally wrong." 9 This presumption was adopted by the Washington
Supreme Court and virtually every other jurisdiction. 10
The traditional rule of employment at will was derived from the doctrine
of complete freedom of contract. 11 When an employer hired an employee,
the parties formed a contract to exchange labor for wages. The employee
gave no consideration in addition to labor to support any promise of
continued employment made by the employer. Even if an employer prom-
ised to terminate only for cause, that promise was unenforceable since it
was not supported by consideration. Accordingly, employment was "at
6. See Blades, supra note 4; Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in
the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979): Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Timefor
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
7. See Strasser, Employment at Will: The Death ofa Doctrine?, Nat'I L.J.,Jan. 20, 1986, at 1. col.
2 (list of each state and exception recognized); see also Wald & Wolf, Recent Developments in the Law
of Employment at Will, I LAB. LAw. 533, 555-80 (state by state survey summarizing key cases in each
state).
8. The presumption of a one year employment agreement was borrowed from the common law of
England at the time. See, e.g., Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857).
9. Payne v. Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Waters, 132
Tenn. 527,179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915); see also W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEEcH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION:
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 1-42 (1985).
10. Davidson v. Mackell-Paine Veneer Co., 149 Wash. 685, 271 P. 878 (1928). New York, for
example, replaced the one year presumption with an at will presumption in Martin v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
I1. See Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1825 (1980).
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will." Employers and employees could bargain for a definite term of
employment, provided that their express employment agreement was sup-
ported by consideration in addition to the contemplated services. 12
This rule acknowledged the political power of business interests in the
late 19th century. 13 It seemed entirely logical in an economy where most
employment relationships were short-term and wages were not a large
share of national income.
As the economy became more industrialized, regulation proved neces-
sary to check the abuse of business power. 14 Congress enacted statutes
prohibiting employers from terminating employees for engaging in certain
specified conduct. 15 As other abuses were recognized, such as discrimina-
tion based on race or sex, Congress further regulated an employer's
relationship with its employees. 16 These statutes are all based on group
conduct and protect only identified groups. Union supporters, women, and
racial minorities were protected, not as individuals, but as group members.
If an individual employee did not belong to a protected group, the employee
could be terminated for any reason whatsoever.
Recently, courts have sharply limited the freedom of employers to
terminate employees at will. The California Court of Appeals, in 1959, was
the first court to impose such limitations. 17 Since that time, the judicially-
created exceptions have, in some jurisdictions, almost swallowed the
traditional rule. 18 These exceptions have generally taken three forms:
public policy (tort), contract, and an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 19
12. Under the at will doctrine, "[t]he employee must have a contract that fulfills the requirement of
additional consideration or it will not be enforced." W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 9, at 47. For
a discussion of the circumstances where this additional consideration requirement was met and a
collection of cases, see id. at 47-50.
13. See Krauskofp, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule, 51
UMKC L. REv. 189, 191 (1983).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3)(1982) (discharge for union
or protected concerted activities unlawful) [hereinafter NLRA]; Federal Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982) (discharge for invoking provisions of the Act unlawful).
16. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2002(a) (1982) (discharge for race or
sex unlawful); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982)
(discharge based on age unlawful).
17. Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959)
(discharge when employee refused to commit perjury wrongful).
18. Murg, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 329
(1982).
19. This Comment sets forth the general doctrine of employment at will to support the basic
analysis: developing an alternate system to resolve wrongful termination disputes. A detailed examina-
tion of the doctrine surrounding each exception to employment at will is beyond the scope of this
Comment and may be found in several other commentaries. See generally, Lopatka, supra note 1; W.
HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 9; Murg, supra note 18.
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B. Exceptions to the Traditional Rule
1. Public Policy Theories
The public policy exception is the oldest and most widely recognized
exception to the traditional rule of employment at will.20 Under this
exception, courts recognize an action for wrongful termination when an
employee is terminated for a reason that violates public policy. 2' The
exception covers three situations: where the employee is terminated for
refusing to commit an unlawful act;22 where the employee is terminated for
acting in the recognized public interest; 23 and where the employee is
terminated for exercising a legal right. 24
In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 25 the Washington Supreme Court
adopted the public policy exception to employment at will. 26 To state a
claim, an employee must plead and prove that the discharge violated an
explict judicially or legislatively recognized public policy. 27 The burden
then shifts to the employer to prove that the discharge was motivated for
reasons other than those claimed by the employee. 28
In adopting this exception, the Thompson court left many questions
unanswered. First, what constitutes public policy? Next, is an employee's
action or inaction to be judged subjectively, objectively, or by the law
applicable to the employee's conduct? What is the result when the em-
ployer, wrongfully, but in good faith, believes that the requested act is
lawful? These, among other concerns, were not addressed by the
Thompson court.
20. Committee Report, supra note 1.
21. For a general discussion of the public policy approach, see Wald & Wolf, supra note 7, at
535-41 (survey of 1984 decisions on public policy exception).
22. See, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l Inc., 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984) (refusal to libel
former co-worker); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489,265 N.W.2d
385 (1978) (refusal to alter pollution control records).
23. See, e.g., Buethe v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 749 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir.), appeal after remand, 787
F.2d 1194 (1984) (refusing to fly airplane considered unsafe); Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85
Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (assisting in police investigation).
24. See, e.g., DeLaCruz v. Pruitt, 590 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (expressing political
beliefs); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (filing a workman's
compensation claim).
25. 102 Wn. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). For a brief commentary on the Thompson decision, see
Note, Three New Exceptions to the Employment At Will Doctrine, 60 WASH. L. REV. 209 (1984).
26. Thompson, 102 Wn. 2d at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 232-33, 685 P.2d at 1089.
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2. Contract Theories
The contract exception to the traditional rule binds an employer to
promises made to employees. 29 This exception avoids the traditional rule in
one of two ways. First, the court may relax or eliminate the traditional
consideration requirement. 30 Alternately, the court may use promissory
estoppel to bind employers to promises which justifiably induce reliance by
employees. 31 Under either theory, contract rights are created in the 'm-
ployee based on a promise or course of conduct by the employer.
The relaxed consideration approach draws largely on Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield.32 In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
unilateral statements of employer policy created contract rights for the
employee despite the absence of consideration or mutuality of obligation. 33
The court replaced the traditional contract analysis with a pragmatic
examination of the workplace. As the court noted, employees generally
lack the bargaining power to make detailed employment contracts. 34 In-
stead, most employees accept the conditions of employment specified by
the employer, and rely on the employer to honor the conditions estab-
lished. 35 When the employer promises to place limits on its discretion to
terminate employees, the practical realities of the workplace require that
the promise be enforced.
This relaxed consideration approach has been well-received in many
state courts. 36 Following Toussaint, binding employment contracts may be
implied from statements in employee handbooks, 37 promises made in
employment interviews, 38 statements in stock option plans, 39 and many
29. For a general discussion of the contract exception, see Wald & Wolf, supra note 7 at 555-79
(survey of 1984 decisions on contract exception).
30. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. While the relaxed consideration and promissory
estoppel concepts are analytically separate, both courts and commentators treat them together under the
general rubric of the implied contract exception. Accordingly, they will be treated together in this
Comment as well.
32. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
33. Id. at 892.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The implied contract exception has been adopted in 31 states. Strasser, supra note 7, at 6.
37. A breach of contract claim based on statements in an employee handbook was made in 38 cases
during 1984 and plaintiffs reached the jury in 18 cases. Committee Report, supra note 1, at 785-86.
Successful claims include: Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., 728 F2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984); Liekvold v. Valley
View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984).
38. Claims based on oral representations made to employees were litigated in 22 cases during 1984,
with plaintiffs reaching the jury in seven cases. Committee Report, supra note 1, at 786. Successful
cases include: Kitzmillerv. Washington Post, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3015 (D.D.C. 1984) (oral promise
of lifetime employment); Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440,203 Cal. Rptr. 9
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other circumstances. 40
Washington has adopted this form of contract exception to the traditional
at will rule.41 In Thompson, the court noted that statements contained in
policy manuals or employee handbooks could create an implied contract to
terminate only for cause. 42 The court explained that a given statement
would be evaluated according to the principles of contract formation: offer,
acceptance and consideration. 43 While the court did not identify the consid-
eration necessary to support the employer's promise, it cited with approval
cases holding that consideration is not a prerequisite to an implied employ-
ment contract. 44 Thus, the court appeared to relax the traditional bar-
gained-for exchange requirement.
Promissory estoppel provides a second basis for implying an employ-
ment contract. In Thompson, for example, the court stated that an employer
(1984) (representation of permanent career); Toshiba Am., Inc. v. Simmons, 104 A.D.2d 649, 480
N.Y.S.2d 28 (1984) (oral promise of job security).
39. See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984).
(Although employment was at will, -[tlhe [stock opinion] agreement defined the employment rela-
tionship."). Commentators have suggested that statements in such deferred compensation plans may
form an implied employment contract. See, e.g.. W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 12, at 100-04.
40. See, e.g., Gaulden v. Emerson Elec. Co., 284 Ark. 149, 680 S.W.2d 92 (1984) (employment
application), Shipley v. Herman Grant Co., 673 S.W.2d 149 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (statements in
corporate minutes).
4 1. Thompson. 102 Wn. 2d at 228-29. 685 P.2d at 1087. The contract exception has had a history
of ebb and flow in Washington. As early as 1955, the court recognized that statements made to
employees could, if supported by consideration, create an employment contract. Lasser v. Grunbaum
Bros. Furniture, 46 Wn. 2d 408, 281 P.2d 832 (1955). Ten years later, however, the court expressly
affirmed the at will rule, holding that an employment contract must be supported by consideration in
addition to the labor services performed. Webster v. Schauble, 65 Wn. 2d 849,400 P.2d 292 (1965). In
Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wn. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977), the court first embraced the implied
employment contract concept. The court stated that whether an employment agreement could be
implied was not governed by consideration and mutuality of obligation, but by the parties' intent,
business custom, the type of employment and the totality of the circumstances.
Whatever protection was given employees in Roberts, was quickly eliminated by Parker v. United
Airlines, 32 Wn. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982). In Parker, the court refused to imply an employment
agreement despite express promises by the corporate president that employees would be treated fairly
and terminated only for cause. Under Parker, an employee apparently had to prove that the employer
subjectively intended to provide just cause protection.
Thompson was intended to change the analysis of Parker and allow courts to imply employment
agreements. The court of appeals, however, has given Thompson a narrow reading and has affirmed
dismissal of the employee's complaint in the only appellate decisions after Thompson. Armstrong v.
Richland Clinic, 42 Wn. App. 181: Heriot v. United Airlines, Civ. No. 13672-I-I (Wn. Ct. App. March
28, 1986) . In both cases the court found that the evidence established only the employee's subjective
understanding of an employment agreement which was insufficient to imply an agreement. Accord-
ingly. both courts affirmed the successful motions to dismiss.
42. Thompson. 102 Wn. 2d at 228-29; 685 P.2d at 1087.
43. Id.
44. Id. The court cited 10 cases in support of the implied contract exception. In all 10 cases cited.
the court held that consideration in addition to labor service was not a prerequisite to an employment
contract.
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may be bound to promises of specific treatment in specific situations.45 The
court explained that employers frequently issue employee oriented mate-
rials to create an atmosphere of fair treatment and job security.46 Employees
justifiably rely on these materials in deciding whether to accept or remain
on a job.47 Since the promises are designed to induce this reliance, the
employer's promises will be enforced.48
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The implied covenant exception is the most recent and least approved
exception to the traditional rule.49 Under this theory, there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every employment relationship. 50
There need not be an employment contract; rather, whenever an employee
is terminated, the court examines the employer's good faith and fair dealing
on a case-by-case basis. If an employee is terminated without just cause, the
employer has not acted in good faith, and the termination is wrongful. 51
Washington rejected the implied covenant exception in Thompson. 52 The
court reasoned that this approach gave insufficient consideration to an em-
ployer's interest in managing its business and would" subject each discharge
to judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad faith." 53 The court
feared that judicial examination of the circumstances surrounding each
employee's termination would cause employers to act inefficiently, consume
enormous resources, and unduly clog the judicial system. 54 The court also
noted that such a radical change was best left for the legislative process. 55
45. Id. For a general discussion of the promissory estoppel theory, see Wald & Wolf, supra note 7.
Promissory estoppel was raised in 13 cases reported during 1984 and plaintiffs were successful in
establishing an employment contract in eight of those cases. Committee Report, supra note I.
46. Thompson, 102 Wn. 2d at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Only 5 states, Alaska, California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Montana, have adopted this
exception. Strasser, supra note 7. The implied covenant exception was raised in 40 cases reported in
1984 and plaintiffs succeeded in only 13 of these cases. Moreover, all states considering this exception
for the first time in 1984 rejected it. Committee Report, supra note 1.
50. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). Under this
theory, factors such as an employee's longevity and the employer's failure to follow established
procedure for termination may establish the employer's bad faith in its termination decision.
51. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). Under California
law, if a termination is undertaken for reasons other than the employee's performance deficiencies and
with an intent to deprive the employee of the benefits ofthe implied employmentcontract, the termination
will be in bad faith. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 266, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
52. Thompson, 102 Wn. 2d at 227, 685 P.2d at 1086.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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C. Remedies for Wrongful Termination
When fashioning a remedy for wrongfully terminated employees, a court
can use either the remedy traditionally associated with the underlying form
of action (contract or tort) or adopt the "make whole" approach used in
traditional labor relations actions. Each scheme, however, adopts the
remedy from the analogous cause of action, without specifically consider-
ing the needs of the employer and employee.
The most frequently used remedial scheme tracks the underlying theory
of the action. 56 If the action is for breach of contract, the employee is
entitled to monetary damages; in other words, lost earnings. 57 Con-
sequential damages, such as injury to reputation, are not available. 58
Reinstatement is viewed as specific performance, and is not available
unless circumstances render a damage remedy inadequate. 59
If the action is in tort, as with a discharge in violation of public policy,
the full range of tort damages may be available. 60 Moreover, in some
jurisdictions, breach of an employment contract is also a tort, thus making
the tort damages available in contract actions as well. 6 1
Fewer courts follow the "make whole" approach derived from tradi-
tional labor law in which reinstatement is the normal remedy.62 The goal is
56. Relatively few reported wrongful termination decisions explicitly discuss the appropriate rem-
edy. The measures of damages, however, "is a function of the theory of liability, i.e. whether contract,
tort, status or statutory." W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 9. at 398-99. For an overview of the
principles generally applied in wrongful termination remedies, see id. at 397-421.
57. Id. at 473-84 (methodology for calculating lost earnings).
58. Consequential damages are subject to the same foreseeability limitation present in a traditional
breach of contract action. See Valentine v. General Am. Credit, 123 Mich. App. 521, 332 N.W.2d 591
(1978), aff'd, 420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984) (consequential and punitive damages unavailable
in a contract action unless an independent tort is established); Gunsolley v. Bushby, 19 Or. App. 884.529
P.2d 950 (1974).
59. W. HOLLOWAY& M. LEECH, supra note 9, at 410. "There is an almost universally recognized bar
to the exercise of a court's equitable power to reinstate an employee . . . if the purpose is to provide
monetary relief." In unusual circumstances, courts have granted reinstatement as a remedy. See, e.g.,
Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267,142 Cal. Rptr. 418,572 P.2d 32 (1977) (reinstatement appropriate for
surgical intern because damages, loss of professional status, could not be measured); Duval v. Severson,
15 11. App. 3d 634,304 N.E.2d747 (1973) (reinstatement ofa co-ownerofa small business appropriate to
protect capital investment which would otherwise be lost).
60. To recover for emotional distress, the emotional injury must have a physical manifestation, or be
intended by the employer. W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 9, at 404. For cases in which such
injuries were compensable, see, Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647 (1982).
Punitive damages are also available if the discharge was with fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence,
or wanton disregard of the employee's rights. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 lll.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353.
359 (1978).
61. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAw oFTORTS § 92(5thed. 1984). At least twojurisdictions,
California and Michigan, follow this rule. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Bissell, 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.
Mich 1980);Smithers v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 139 Cal. App. 3d643, 189 Cal. Rptr. 20(1983).
62. SeeBrockmeyerv. Dun& Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d561,335 N.W.2d 834(1983). While Wisconsin
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to place the employee in the same position he or she would have been
without the employer's unlawful act. Thus, the employer must offer to
return the employee to work, and make compensation for any wages or
benefits lost as a result of the termination. 63 Courts adopting this approach
view wrongful termination actions as closely analogous to violations of
employee protective statutes and reason that the remedies should be analo-
gous as well. 64
In Washington, no reported decision explicitly describes the appropriate
remedy for a wrongfully terminated employee. The theory in Thompson,
however, was based on common law, not statutory causes of action. One
might infer, therefore, that Washington would adopt a remedial scheme
based on the form of the underlying claim.
II. DEFICIENCIES IN THE COMMON LAW APPROACH
While each common law exception to the doctrine of employment at will
offers some protection to employees, all exceptions recognized in Wash-
ington suffer from analytical and practical difficulties. A statutory ap-
proach, in contrast, can eliminate these deficiencies and better balance the
competing interests.
The public policy approach protects only those employees whose dis-
charge violates a judicially or legislatively recognized public policy. If the
motivation for the discharge does not fit this category, no cause of action
will lie.65 Since this exception covers only the most outrageous employer
conduct, it offers minimal protection to employees. In addition to its
limited application, this approach suffers from many of the difficulties
discussed below.
The implied contract exception, while enjoying a wider application, still
fails to properly balance the needs of employers, employees, and the public at
large. Although this exception often is hailed as providing job security for
employees, the protection offered is largely illusory. The employer retains
control over any offers or promises made to employees. A sophisticated
is the only jurisdiction expressly adopting this rule, other states may have started along this path. For
example, in Kurle v. Evangelical Hosp. Ass'n, 89 Il. App. 3d45, 411 N.E.2d 326,333 (1980), thecourt
noted that the statutory developments in laborrelations have eviscerated the rule against reinstatement for
wrongfully terminated employees. While this may foreshadow an increased willingness to reinstate
employees in Illinois, such a willingness is not yet apparent. At least one commentator suggests that
reinstatement is an appropriate remedy for all wrongfully terminated employees. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES
§ 12.25 (1980).
63. Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
64. Id. Statutory remedies, reinstatement and backpay, were "the most appropriate remedies for
public policy wrongful discharges since the primary concern is to make the employee whole." Id.
65. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
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employer, therefore, may prevent an employment contract from being
formed. 66 Personnel manuals and employee handbooks may be drafted to
contain no guarantee of discharge solely for cause or promise of specific
treatment in specific situations. 67 Supervisors and other management per-
sonnel may be instructed and trained to prevent any oral representations from
creating an employment contract. 68 Thus, only the ignorant or unwitting
employer will inadvertently create just cause protection for its employees.
Disclaimers offer employers another powerful method to prevent forma-
tion of employment contracts. In Thompson, the court specifically noted
that if an employer stated, in a clear and conspicuous manner, that no
representations were intended to create an employment contract, the dis-
claimer would defeat the formation of an employment contract. 69 More-
over, an employer may reserve the right to modify its employment practices
at its discretion. 70 One might expect, therefore, that employer's would
routinely include disclaimers in any communication to employees to pre-
vent possible future liability. 71
Once an employee establishes an implied contract, the employee must
also establish that the employment contract was breached. Usually, a
breach will occur if the employer lacked just cause to terminate the
66. A number of commentators have provided specific guidance to employers on how to prevent
employment contracts from being formed. See, e.g.. Decker, At-Will Employment in PennsYlvania, 87
DIcK. L. REv. 477, 504-05 (1983); Lopatka, supra note I. at 26-32: Moon, Avoiding Liability for
WrongfilDischarge-Managenent Planning andLitigation Tactics, 62 MICH. B .J. 780,781-83 (1983):
Wald & Wolf. supra note 7, at 544-47.
67. Since the terms of the employee/employer communication control the existence of any employ-
ment contract and employers draft such communication, employers have complete control over the
creation of any employment contract. For circumstances where proper drafting will avoid an employment
agreement, see, e.g., Thompson, 102 Wn. 2d at 229, 685 P.2d at 1087 (conspicuous statement that
employment manuals are general expressions of policy and not intended to be part of the employment
relationship defeats an implied employment contract); Novosel v. Sears Roebuck & Co.. 495 F. Supp. 344
(E.D. Mich. 1980) (no implied employment contract where employment application expressly stated
employment was at will).
68. See Earle & Coley, New Protection for the Employee-At-Will: Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 62 MIcH. B.J. 770, 773 (1983) (supervisory training is an important preventative measure for
employers). Since employers are generally responsible for the acts of their supervisors, and supervisors
have the most contact with employees, the importance of supervisory training can hardly be over-
emphasized.
69. Thompson, 102 Wn. 2d at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
70. Id.
71. Some employers routinely place disclaimers in all communications to employees. While Sears'
uniform disclaimer has generally prevented an employment contract from being formed, otheremployers
have not fared as well. Compare Reid v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 588 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Mich. 1984) and
Luft v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2704 (Iowa 1984) (disclaimer established at will
relationship) with Tiranno v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 99 A.D.2d 675,472 N.Y.S.2d49 (1984) (disclaimer
negates any oral representation but employee handbook is an employment contract unaffected by dis-
claimer) andMcCauley v. Thygerson, 732 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disclaimer ineffective to negate any
representation made). See generally Lopatka, supra note 1, at 29-30.
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employee. 72 The court, therefore, must still take the "judicial incursion into
the amorphous concept of bad faith" 73 to determine whether the termina-
tion was for cause.
If successful to this point, the employee must next confront economic
reality. Wrongful termination litigation is fact intensive and requires exten-
sive pretrial discovery.74 There are likely to be several significant pretrial
motions requiring briefing and argument. 75 Unless the employee's
damages are significant, cost considerations may preclude bringing mer-
itorious cases. It is no surprise, therefore, that the reported decisions
involve managerial, supervisory, or executive employees; the average
hourly paid employee remains largely unprotected by current doctrine.
Wrongful termination litigation also presents several problems for em-
ployers. 76 First, if an employer faces the possibility of litigation whenever
an employee is terminated, that employer will be less likely to terminate
employees. 77 To operate efficiently, employees must be hired and fired as
economic considerations and job performances dictate. Of course, effi-
ciency may be affected any time an employer's discretion is limited, and
efficiency does not, in and of itself, suggest that employers should enjoy
complete freedom in personnel decisions. It is, however, a cost which
should be considered when providing just cause protection to employees.
A second employer problem concerns the appropriate remedy. Where
tort damages are available, an employer may be liable for a wide range of
emotional damages. 78 An employer may also face substantial punitive
damages. 79 Where such damages are compensable, the award for a single
72. A breach also may occur if the employment contract specifies pretermination procedures and the
employer fails to follow those procedures.
73. Thompson, 102 Wn. 2d at 227, 685 P.2d at 1086.
74. See Moon, supra note 66 at 783; Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: "Dagwood" and
Goliath, 62 MIcH. B.J. 776, 779 (1983) (discussing plaintiff and defendant discovery tactics).
75. Pretrial motions accounted for 78.8% of state decisions and 91.3% of federal decisions on
wrongful termination reported during 1984. Committee Report, supra note 1, at 785.
76. Employers may face a conflict between this doctrine and the provisions of employee protective
statutes. Forexample, if an employercreates an employee-staffed, internal grievance procedure to resolve
wrongful termination claims, the employer may have promoted a labor organization in violation of the
National Labor Relations Act. Similarly, a performance appraisal system designed to minimize any
disparate impact may create an implied contract that any performance deficiencies will be noted in that
appraisal. See, e.g., Haslaam v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2950 (Mich. 1984); Chamberlain
v. Bissel, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (employee review procedure created an implied
employment contract). Accordingly, employers must carefully examine the effects of any personnel
policy on all aspects of labor relations.
77. Simple economics dictate this result. If an employee's cost is greater than his production, the
efficient act is to terminate the employee. If, however, the transaction costs of the termination are greater
than the savings, the employer will not terminate the employee.
78. See supra note 60.
79. McGrathv. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d458 (7th Cir. 1981) (Thetrialcourt awarded$1,000,000
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termination may exceed $1,000,00080 and be significantly disproportional
to the injury inflicted.
Reinstatement, where available, is another element of employer concern.
Reinstated employees frequently lack any support group in the workplace,
are susceptible to retaliatory treatment, and, as a result, tend to have low
productivity and high turnover. 81 Accordingly, reinstatement is not a
favored remedy for wrongful terminations. 82
Finally, the contract exception creates several social costs. This excep-
tion injects a preliminary issue-whether an employment contract exists-
into the analysis of the termination decision. Typically, the bulk of the
litigation centers around this preliminary issue, with relatively little time
spent on the just cause question. 83 Since the purpose is to provide job
security to the employee, just cause, not whether a contract exists, is the
important question. Thus, the resources spent on the preliminary contract
question achieve little social gain.
More generally, one must consider whether litigation is an appropriate
method to resolve wrongful termination disputes. Several factors counsel
against litigation as the best dispute resolution procedure. First, courts
often lack experience and training in labor relations matters. 84 Second,
litigation unduly delays the recovery by a wrongfully terminated employee,
a person who may not have an alternate source of income pending the
resolution of the claim. Moreover, litigation is a very costly method to
resolve these disputes. Finally, if even a fraction of the estimated 200,000
in compensatory and 1,000,000 in punitive damages to a wrongfully terminated employee. On appeal,
compensatory damages were reduced to $300,000 but punitive damages were sustained.).
80. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.). cert. denied, 459 U.S.
859 (1982) ($1,900,000 million actual and punitive damages plus $400,000 in attorneys fees to three
wrongfully terminated executives); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981) (trial
court award of $2,000,000): Chamberlin v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.. Mich. 1980) (total
damages $1. 1 million offset by employees comparative negligence).
81. Reinstatement is not an effective remedy in a nonunion setting. McDermott & Newhams.
Discharge-Reinstatement: WhatHappensThereafter, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 526(1971); Ross, The
Arbitration Discharge Cases: What Happens After Reinstatement, PROCEEDINGS OFTHE lOTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE NAT'L ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 21-56 (McKelvey ed. 1957).
82. See supra note 59.
83. See supra note 75. None of the cases involving pretrial motions reported during 1984 deal with
the just cause issue. Instead, the decisions concern whether an employment agreement was established,
whether the claim was preempted, orsome otherpreliminary matter. See Committee Report, supra note 1.
at 785. The delay while these pretrial motions are decided can be substantial. In Thompson, for example,
the employee was terminated in July, 1980 and the employer was first compelled to answer interrogatories
in July, 1984. 102 Wn.2d at 221, 685 P.2d at 1082.
84. The concern is not that courts are unable to decide labor relations issues, but that an arbitrator
who wrestles with the issue ofjust cause every day is betterequipped to examine just cause questions. See
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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employees terminated each year under questionable circumstances 85
sought legal relief, they would increase considerably the delays now
present in the judicial system.
III. A PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
A wrongful termination statute can be designed to serve the needs of
both employers and employees. To do so, the statute must guarantee just
cause protection to employees who have completed an initial probationary
period. 86 This protection must be enforced through a prompt hearing with a
decision required within a short, specified period of time. The employee's
remedy would be limited to backpay; reinstatement and compensation for
emotional distress would not be available. Backpay would accrue from the
date of discharge until either the employee obtained alternate employment
or a specified date in the future. To remain eligible for backpay, the
employee must actively seek employment. If the employee prevails at the
initial hearing, the employee must receive backpay immediately. The
backpay would be paid out of a state-sponsored fund. While an employer
may appeal the initial decision, the employer must reimburse the state for
the backpay expense, if, after the appeals are exhausted, the termination
was without just cause.
A statutory guarantee of just cause protection must co-exist with em-
ployee protective statutes as well as with collective bargaining agreements.
Where the basis for an employee's wrongful termination claim is cogniza-
ble under the National Labor Relations Act, the state law wrongful termina-
tion claim is preempted. 87 Where unionized employees enjoy binding
arbitration over discharge disputes, the employee may only proceed in a
single forum at a time. As long as the employee's union grievance is being
pursued, the employee's wrongful termination claim is preempted. 88 If the
85. The estimate comes from Peck, supra note 6, at 10. See also 121 Lab. Rel. Rep. No. 23 (BNA)
(1982) at 24-25.
86. Probationary periods are widely recognized as effective screening devices to measure an em-
ployee's job performance. An employee serving a probationary period knows that he orshe has few vested
rights in that position and generally has made but a slight investment in training, foregone opportunities,
and housing or other living arrangements.
87. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (state regulation of activities
arguably protected or arguably prohibited under section 7 or section 8 of the NLRA preempted).
Preemption can arise in two ways. First, if deciding the wrongful termination claim requires interpreting
the NLRA, the claim is preempted. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 106 S.Ct.
1904 (1986) (claim of fraud against union which assured supervisors that they could not be lawfully fired
preempted since it requires resolving supervisory status under § 2(11) ofthe NLRA); Viestenzv. Fleming
Cos., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982) (discharge for union organizing
preempted by NLRA). Alternatively, if the terminated employee is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement providing just cause protection, the wrongful discharge claim is preempted by section 301 of
the NLRA. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
88. "[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependentupon analysis of an agreement
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union drops the grievance, the employee may then seek statutory relief.89
Under such a system, employees receive prompt compensation for their
losses. Employers, however, need not rehire terminated employees and face
only a specific, limited penalty for the wrongful termination. Moreover, the
cost of resolving wrongful termination claims, when compared with litiga-
tion, is substantially reduced. Accordingly, the essential interests of em-
ployers, as well as employees, are served.
A. Just Cause Standard
Just cause is, of course, a difficult concept to define. While labor
arbitration has developed a substantial body of law interpreting what
constitutes just cause for termination, labor arbitration is somewhat dif-
ferent from wrongful termination litigation. 90 Accordingly, while labor
made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim. . .. or
dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law." Allis-Chalmers Corp.. 105 S. Ct. at 1917. If the
union contract containsjust cause protection, the wrongful termination claim would require an analysis of
that contract and would be preempted. See generally Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption of State
Wrongul Discharge Actions. 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1985).
89. If the union drops the employee's grievance, the employee has no other direct remedies under the
collective bargaining agreement. The employee's only recourse is to file a duty of fair representation
action under section 301 of the NLRA. In the section 301 action, the primary issue is whether the union's
decision to dismiss the grievance was in bad faith. Whether the grievance was meritorious is a secondary
issue. See. e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967): Ruzicka v. General Motors, 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir.
1981).
This potential section 301 remedy should not preempt the employee's statutory wrongful termination
action, although this result is not free from doubt. When employees covered by a collective bargaining
agreement containing just cause protection file a wrongful termination suit, courts are split over whether
employees must exhaust their contractual remedies. Compare Peabody Galion v. Dollar. 666 F2d 1309
(10th Cir. 1981) and Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.. 105 1ll.2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 278 (1985) (exhaustion not required) with McKiness v. Western Union Tel. Co.. 667
S.W.2d 738 (Mo. App. 1984) (exhaustion required).
The better view is that exhaustion is not required unless the claim would also constitute an unfair labor
practice. State statutes regulating labor relations are not preempted if they are merely peripherally related
to the NLRA or touch interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that it cannot be inferred
that Congress deprived the states of the power to act. Peabody. 666 F.2d at 1315. Ifone may safely presume
that deciding a wrongful termination claim even though the employee has not pursued the section 301
remedy '. .. will not disserve the interests promoted by the federal labor statutes," then the claim is not
preempted. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
The statute proposed herein falls within these principles. The statute reflects a state decision that all
employees are entitled to contest their termination. This statutory wrongful termination action does not
require determining the union's reason for dropping the grievance. As such, permitting the wrongful
termination action is merely peripherally related to section 301. Accordingly, the wrongful termination
claim should not be preempted.
Of course, if the wrongful termination claim involved matters arguably protected or arguably pro-
hibited by section 7 or section 8 of the NLRA, the claim would be preempted under the Garmion doctrine.
See supra. note 87.
90. A labor arbitrator analyzes a termination under a specific contractual test. This analysis requires
balancing the severity of the employee's transgression with the principles of corrective discipline and the
punishment given. The arbitrator has a wide variety of remedial tools with which to make the balance. In
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arbitration decisions may provide a useful starting place to define just cause
in the wrongful termination context, just cause must be analyzed indepen-
dently.
There are two elements of proof in a wrongful termination claim: proof of
wrongdoing, and proof that the wrongdoing justified termination. 91 An
employee is not terminated for cause if either the employee did not commit
the infraction causing the termination, or the einployee could not be expected
to foresee that committing the infraction would lead to termination.
Whether an employee committed a given infraction is primarily a ques-
tion of fact. On this factual issue, the employer should bear the burden of
proof.92 Proof should be by a preponderance of evidence. 93
Proof that the employee committed the conduct in question does not itself
establish that the termination was for cause. The conduct also must either be
prohibited by a work rule, or be such that a reasonable employee would
recognize that it might result in termination.94 The latter could occur in two
ways. First, certain conduct, such as theft, intoxication, or assault, is widely
recognized as grounds for immediate termination. 95 Second, the employer
may have an unwritten, but widely recognized and consistently enforced
policy of termination for a given offense. 96 If such a policy exists, then
employees have sufficient notice of the consequences of their conduct, and
act at their peril.
contrast, a wrongful termination claim offers no flexibility in remedy; the employee receives either full
backpay or nothing at all. The opportunity to fine-tune the appropriate discipline is eliminated.
91. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITrAnON WORKS 661 (4th ed. 1985).
92. Placing the burden of proof on the employer is justified for two reasons. First, the employer has
superior access to the facts surrounding the termination. Second, if the employee bore the burden, the
employee would be in the untenable position of proving a negative. For these reasons, the employer
generally bears the burden of proof in labor arbitration. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 91, at
661-63. In wrongful termination statutes in other countries, the employer bears the burden of proving a
legitimate reason for the discharge. Estreicher, UnjustDismissalLaws:Some CautionaryNotes, 33 AM.
J. COMP. L. 310,313 (1985).
Since wrongful termination claims under the proposed statute do not depend on the employer having a
discriminatory motive, the alternating burden analysis used in Title VII and NLRA cases to determine the
employer's motivation is inapplicable. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393
(1983) (NLRA); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (Title VII).
93. Since the wrongful termination claim would not be based on a private agreement, but on a civil
statute, proof should be by a preponderance of evidence. In contrast, the standard of proof is an unsettled
issue in labor arbitration with significant variation from arbitratorto arbitrator. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
supra note 91, at 661.
94. Overhead Door Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 1299,70 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1299, 1301 (1978) (Dworkin, Arb.); Koppas Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 613,614 (1977) (Harkless, Arb.).
95. Hilo Coast Processing Co. v.International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local
142, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 236,240 (1980) (Tanaka, Arb.) (discharge for threatening a fellow employee
upheld against claim it was condoned by management: "[I]t would be unreasonable for any employee to
believe that fighting or the threatening of fellow employees are those types of acts which would ever be
condoned by management.").
96. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 91, at 683.
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Employers also may specify prohibited conduct in work rules. It is well-
settled that employers have a fundamental right to unilaterally establish
reasonable plant rules. 97 A plant rule is reasonable if it is reasonably related
to a legitimate management objective. 98 Plant rules must be widely dis-
seminated to employees to provide notice of what conduct is forbidden. 99
These rules must also be enforced in a consistent and nondiscriminatory
manner. While neither absolute consistency nor slavish adherence to pro-
cedure is required, if an employer's enforcement practices would cause a
reasonable employee to view the conduct in question as sanctioned by
management or subject to lesser discipline, then discharge for such conduct
is without just cause. 100
B. Administration
This proposal for protection from unjust termination can be adopted in
Washington without creating a new administrative agency. The Depart-
ment of Employment Security can readily enforce the proposed statutory
scheme with only minor modifications to its existing procedure.' 0
Currently, when employees are terminated, they are eligible for unem-
ployment compensation unless they are terminated for misconduct. 02
Misconduct is not equivalent to just cause. 103 The Department investigates
the employee's claim for compensation and holds hearings on contested
claims. ' 04 If an employee is determined eligible for benefits, the benefits
97. Id., at553. "It is well established... that management has the fundamental right unilaterally to
establish reasonable plant rules not inconsistent with law .. "
98. "The test of reasonableness of a rule is not measured by counting the number of times the problem
arises which it is designed to guard against. The test is whether or not the rule is reasonably related to a
legitimate objective of management .... " Robertshaw Controls Co. v. United Auto., Aerospace &
Agricultural Implement Workers, 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 283,286 (1970) (Block, Arb.).
99. "[A] reasonable rule must be one which the employees can understand and comply with."
Hoover Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1287, 1290(1982) (Strasshofer,
Arb.).
100. See Heriot v. United Airlines, Civ. No. 13672-I-I (Wash. Ct. App. March 28, 1986) (substantial
compliance with pretermination procedure satisfies an employer's contractual obligation to the termi-
nated employee). In arbitration law, the test is whether the employer's lax enforcement of the rules would
cause a reasonable employee to believe the conduct was condoned by management. F. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, supra note 91, at 683-84.
101. See infra note 109 and accompanying text; cf Bellace, A Right of Fair Disnissal: Enforcing a
Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207, 231-47 (1983) (a related suggestion for a wrongful
termination statute with administrative enforcement, with particular application to Pennsylvania law).
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.060 (1985).
103. Misconduct is defined as conduct which is related to the employee's work, harmed the em-
ployer's interest, violated a work rule or policy, and was done with the intent or knowledge that the
employer's interests would suffer. Ciskie v. Department of Employment Security, 35 Wn. App. 72. 664
P.2d 1318 (1983).
104. WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 50.32.010-160 (1985).
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are paid out of a state fund, funded by employer contributions. 105 To remain
eligible for benefits, the employee must actively seek work. 106 The Depart-
ment monitors the employee's work search and assists the employee in
finding employment. 107 If the employee finds employment or leaves the
labor market, eligibility for benefits ends. 108
The present unemployment compensation procedure may be easily mod-
ified to enforce a guarantee of just cause protection. First, the legislature
should enact a statute preventing the termination of employees without just
cause, to be enforced by the Department of Employment Security. 109 If an
employee was terminated for cause, but not for misconduct, he or she would
be entitled to currently existing unemployment benefits. If, however, the
employee was terminated without cause, and therefore not for misconduct,
he or she would receive, in addition to existing benefits, compensation such
that total weekly benefits would equal the average pretermination weekly
income. The employer would be liable to the state for the additional benefits
paid as a result of the termination without cause. The duration of benefits,
as well as the procedure to remain eligible for benefits, would remain
unchanged.
IV. THE NEED FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH TO
WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS
A statutory approach to wrongful termination cannot succeed simply on
its own merits: it will require political support as well. Commentators have
suggested that unorganized employees, the statute's primary beneficiaries,
lack the political power to enact such a statute. 110 Thus, until courts began
to modify the doctrine of employment at will, suggestions that a statutory
approach was preferable went unheeded. 11' As that doctrine becomes
105. WASH. ADMIN. CODE. § 192-12-040 (1985).
106. WASH. REv. CODE. § 50.20.010 (1985). If an employee imposes severe restrictions on the type
of work they will accept, they are not "available" for work. Arima v. Department of Employment
Security, 29 Wn. App. 344, 628 P.2d 500 (1981).
107. WASH. REv. CODE § 50.22.020(5) (1985).
108. Id.
109. The Department will, of course, require additional funding to implement this statute. The
Department also must hire and train the arbitrators.
110. See Blades, supra note 4; Peck, supra note 6. Statutes protecting "whistleblowers" from
retaliatory discharge and prohibiting employers from subjecting employees to a polygraph examination
have, however, been enacted in recent years. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-5Im (West 1983);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. Title 26 §§ 831-39 (1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 15.361-15.369 (1981) ("whis-
tleblower" statutes); WASH. REv. CODE § 49.44.120 (1985) (polygraph). For a comprehensive list of all
state employee protective statutes, see W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 9, at 430-62. These
statutes, while not as far-reaching as the one proposed herein, involve similar political power concerns.
111. The first suggestion for a wrongful termination statute was in 1976 and has gone unheeded.
Summers, supra note 6.
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increasingly eroded, employers and unions should rethink their opposition
to a wrongful termination statute. Upon such reflection, they may conclude
that a statute like the one proposed herein is in their best interests.
A. Employer Interests
Employers have typically opposed just cause protection on economic
grounds; it was thought to be simply too expensive. Today, however, an
employer's choice is not whether the traditional doctrine should be modi-
fied, but how that modification will occur. When considering the judicial
modification model, employers might consider the California example.
Two recent surveys of California superior court decisions reveal that
plaintiffs in wrongful termination litigation prevail in 90-95% of the cases
with an average judgment of $450,000 to $548,000.1 12 While this data has
a statistical bias, 11 3 it should provide incentive for employers to consider an
alternate method to resolve wrongful termination disputes.
To be sure, most states have not followed California's lead, and some
may never do so. Thus, employers may be tempted to wait until a given state
has developed extensive wrongful termination remedies before considering
other dispute resolution procedures. That delay, however, might prove
counterproductive. As the remedies for wrongfully terminated employees
grow, so will the organized bar representing those employees. 114 As an
organized plaintiffs' bar develops, so will opposition to alternate forms of
dispute resolution and limits on a plaintiff's recovery. 115 The plaintiffs'
employment bar currently is largely unorganized, widely dispersed, and is
unlikely to block or delay a wrongful termination statute.
Moreover, employers should act now to strike a better bargain than may
be available after employees enjoy greater protection in the courts. Cer-
tainly, any wrongful termination statute will limit traditional employer's
powers. If these powers will be usurped eventually, employers would be
112. Lopatka, supra note 1. at 3 (citing studies by the law firm of Orrick, Herring & Sutcliff and by
Fredrick Brown, a San Francisco management lawyer).
113. The data suffer from two significant biases. First, only the high damage cases are likely to go to
trial given the cost of litigating a wrongful termination case. This tends to skew the average judgment
figure. Moreover, cases where the employer has a strong defense are likely to be resolved by a pretrial
motion. Since juries are generally more favorably disposed to wrongful termination actions than are
judges, this tends to skew the plaintiff's success rate. See Palefsky, supra note 74, at 776.
114. A national organization, the Plaintiff Employment Lawyers' Association. has recently been
formed to aid attorneys who represent employees. This organization, however, currently has only 160
members. As the organizer of PELA noted, "plaintiffs' attorneys who represent employees are few in
number and are scattered throughout the country." "PELA" Network for PlaintifftEmplov'ees, 121 Lab
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 202 (1986).
115. The recent debate on product liability and tort reform exemplifies this phenomenon. The Trial
Lawyers Association has spent substantial time and money in an effort to block or delay changes which
would limit the rights and remedies of personal injury plaintiffs.
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wise to exchange their current, although temporary, power for a long-term
solution.
Finally, the European experience with wrongful termination statutes
suggests that the burden placed on employers may be slight. 11 6 Under Great
Britian's statute, for example, the median recovery by a wrongfully termi-
nated employee is approximately $500, and 75% of all awards are for less
than $1000.117 Moreover, none of the countries with such legislation have
experienced any effort by employers to alter or eliminate such legisla-
tion. 118 Thus, while one might believe that a wrongful termination statute
would place intolerable burdens on employers, experience under such
statutes establishes otherwise.
B. Union Interests
Unions also are seen as major opponents of wrongful termination legisla-
tion. Under the traditional view, a union's primary selling point in organiza-
tional campaigns is job security and a grievance procedure. Once employees
are afforded just cause protection by statute, they will no longer need a
union. 119 This analysis, however, overlooks the experience in countries with
wrongful termination statutes as well as the range of services employees
receive from a union. When these factors are considered, it is likely such
legislation will help, rather than hinder, union organizing drives.
In most European nations, wrongful termination statutes coexist with
healthy labor organizations. 120 Indeed, European union leaders frequently
cite these statutes as an aid in their organizing efforts. 121 When unor-
116. See generally Estreicher, supra note 92. Canada also protects employees who have been
employed by an employer for one year and are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement from
wrongful termination. The experience under the Canadian wrongful termination statute is discussed in
England, Unjust Dismissal in the Federal Jurisdiction: The First Three Years, 16 MANITOBA. L.J. 9
(1982).
117. Sherman, Reinstatement as a Remedy for Unfair Dismissal in Common Market Countries, 29
AM. J. OF COMP. LAW 467, 504 (1981). Employers won 72.3% of all cases decided in Britian during 1978.
Moreover, while reinstatement is a potential remedy, "in actual practice no Common Market country
requires employers to reinstate most of the employees who are found by a government body. . . to have
been unfairly dismissed." Id. at 507.
118. Id. But see Wall St. J., April20, 1983, at6, col. 2notingthewidespreaddissatisfactionwith the
Portugese wrongful termination statute. This statute requires judicial determination of wrongful termina-
tions and provides reinstatement and backpay for wrongfully terminated employees. The primary com-
plaints have been the delay and cost of judicial determinations and employer's dissatisfaction with
reinstated employees. Those problems would not be present under the statute proposed herein.
119. Blades, supra note 4, at 1434 n. 140; Minda, The Common Law ofEmploymentAt Will in New
York: The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 939,943 (1985).
120. Estreicher, supra note 92; Sherman, supra note 117.
121. See J. STIEBER & J. BLACKBURN, PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST
DISCHARGE 65 (1983) (remarks of R. Coulson); 121 Lab. Rel. Rep. No.23 at 18 (BNA) (1982) ("Unions
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ganized employees challenge an employer's termination decision, em-
ployees generally learn what rights they have and why those rights need
protection. 122 Moreover, in contesting the employer's decision, employees
often find that they need assistance in investigating and presenting the
underlying facts involved, This assistance is frequently provided by the
union. 123 When employees learn of this assistance, they become more
likely to seek union representation. 124
A similar result may follow from the proposed statutory scheme. The
statute only protects employees from wrongful termination; it contains no
protection against lesser discipline, selection for promotions, work assign-
ments, or other matters typically regulated in a collective bargaining
agreement. Furthermore, while the employee is not guaranteed a represen-
tative at the hearing on the termination, the union could provide representa-
tion upon request. While representing the employee, the union could
explain the benefits offered by unionization. If the benefits are sufficient,
the employees may select union representation. In this fashion, the pro-
posed statute could aid, rather than injure, labor organizations.
C. Employee Interests
From the employee's view, the fundamental tradeoff is a limited damage
remedy in exchange for broad coverage and speedy dispute resolution. This
tradeoff should prove satisfactory for most employees.
First, consider the employee's loss from termination. During the course
of employment, employees develop specialized training and skills: their
"human capital." This capital takes two forms, general and firm-specific.
General capital includes any skill which may be transferred to another
employer, while specific capital is a skill useful for only a single employer,
such as training on an individualized machine. 12 5 Thus, the employee's
economic loss is limited to that human capital which cannot be transferred
to another employer. This loss is likely to be small, as most terminated
.. .have had considerable organizing success after they assisted employees who were wrongfully
discharged in winning theirjobs back").
122. See England, supra note 116; Estreicher, supra note 92.
123. In Britain, for example, approximately sixty per cent of employees challenging their termina-
tion are represented at the hearing. Ofthis number, about thirty-seven per cent are represented by counsel;
the rest are represented by a union representative. J. STEIBER & J BLACKBURN, supra note 121, at 77. In
West Germany, union frequently represent nonunion employees challenging their termination before the
Works Council. Id. at 78.
124. In Britain, for example, union membership rose 25% afterwrongful termination legislation was
passed. Id. at 48.
125. The term "human capital" comes from the work of labor economists. According to traditional
labor economics, employees acquire job skills ("human capital") primarily in their youth and receive a
return on this capital throughout their working years. See generally G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed.
1970).
Vol. 62:151 1987
Employment At Will
employees find replacement employment at the same or a greater wage
within a relatively short period of time. 126
Termination also has a psychological impact on the terminated em-
ployee. This psychological trauma may manifest itself through a variety of
psychological symptoms. 127 Yet the psychological trauma, like the eco-
nomic effects, are limited in scope and duration. 128 Moreover, the trauma is
caused by both the loss of income, and the act of the termination. 129 If a
wrongfully terminated employee faces no imminent shortage of money, the
psychological effects of termination will be further reduced.
It has been frequently suggested that legislatures will not protect em-
ployees against unjust dismissal because no organized political group
would lobby for such legislation. '3 0 In the past ten years, however, state
courts have adopted a patchwork of exceptions to the traditional rule of
employment at will. In some states, these exceptions expose employers to
significant liability for terminating an employee. 131 Accordingly, employ-
ers, as well as employees, now may have an interest in supporting wrongful
termination legislation. Indeed, wrongful dismissal legislation has been
proposed in five states. 132 Moreover, the national labor bar soon will be
126. In the first nine months of 1986, 84.5% of unemployed workers found satisfactory alternate
employment in six months or less. In 1984 and 1985, the corresponding percentages were 80.9% and
76.1% N.Y. Times, October 11, 1986, at 13, col. 1.
127. Courts have frequently recognized that terminated employees may suffer emotional distress.
See, e.g., Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum, 351 N.W.2d 371, 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (all
terminated employees may be expected to suffer some mental distress). To recover for such injuries, the
employee generally must show either that the termination was vindictive or that the mental distress was
unusually great. See NV. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 9, at 215-18. The most common forms of
mental distress alleged are caused by financial pressures, lost status, self doubt, and trauma associated
with a job search under unpleasant conditions. Id.
128. See W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 9, at 215-18.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 110.
131. See supra notes 60, 80.
132. California Assembly Bill3017 (1984); Connecticut Committee Bill 8738, Gen. Assembly Jan.
Sess. (1973); Michigan H.R. 5892 (1982); New Jersey Assembly Bill 1832 (1980); Pennsylvania H.R.
1742 (1981). None of these bills were enacted.
In addition, the Washington State Bar Association Civil Rights Committee has drafted a wrongful
termination statute for Washington. This statute providesjustcause protection forall employees subjectto
four listed exceptions. Claims of wrongful termination are adjudicated through mandatory arbitration.
The arbitrators are private parties, not state employees. As a remedy, an employee may recover all
economic loss. Reinstatement is available as a remedy, but if the arbitrator finds that reinstatement will
substantially impairthe employer's business operations, the employee may receive future lost wages ofup
to three years time. Finally, this proposed statute preserves any common law actions the employee has,
including common law wrongful termination claims as well as any othertort action available. Correspon-
dence from Washington State BarAssociation Civil Rights Committee (copy on file with the Washington
Law Review).
Washington Law Review
holding hearings on proposed wrongful termination legislation. 133 Perhaps
these groups have recognized that the time for a statute has now come.
Any wrongful termination statute must identify and balance the compet-
ing interests of employers and employees. This Comment suggests one
method to provide essential protection to employees while minimizing the
disruption to employers. Although a different balance may eventually be
struck on some issues, this Comment provides a general framework to
achieve that goal.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past two decades, courts have created a variety of exceptions to
the traditional doctrine of employment at will. These exceptions fall into
three categories: public policy, contract, or implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Although these exceptions provide some protection to
employees, the protection offered is largely illusory. Moreover, the current
judicial remedies for wrongful termination often do not properly reflect the
loss and may come too late to help the terminated employee.
In contrast, an administrative scheme to enforce a statutory guarantee
of just cause protection more precisely balances the competing needs of
employers and employees. It would provide needed job security for em-
ployees without unduly burdening employers. It would offer prompt com-
pensation to wrongfully terminated employees at the time they need it
most. An employer's potential liability will be limited and easily calculable
before the employer takes action. In sum, the proposed administrative
system can better serve employers, employees, and society at large.
Warren Martin
133 Committee Report. supra note I, at 783-85.
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